Matar, dejar morir y eutanasia en el proyecto de ley sobre derechos de las personas y en la doctrina chilena.

Índice h5: 26
Mediana m5: 40

Rodolfo Figueroa G

Autores/as

Rodolfo Figueroa G Licenciado en Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales de la Universidad Diego Portales. Abogado. Master en Derecho y Doctor en Derecho, University of Wisconsin. Profesor de Derecho Constitucional y profesor del Magíster en derecho, Escuela de Derecho de la Universidad Diego Portales. Director del Departamento de Derecho Público y Director del Magíster en Derecho Público, en la misma universidad. República 105, Santiago. Chile.

Palabras clave:

Ethics, medical, Euthanasia, Suicide, assisted

Resumen

TO KILL, LET DIE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS OF PATIENTS AND IN THE CHILEAN DOCTRINE

The Bill of Rights for Patients provides the patient with autonomy for disposing of his life, enabling him to reject those treatments that unnecessarily prolong his life. However, the bill does not allow an artificial acceleration of death. Therefore, the bill does not permit euthanasia (at least, certain form of it) nor assisted-suicide. However, according to the practice of medicine and also Chilean doctrine, it is permitted to inject morphine to a patient to relieve his pain, even though that could hasten his death. In consequence, it is allowed for the patient to dispose of his life and also to inject in him morphine for pain relief, endangering his life, but neither euthanasia nor assisted-suicide is allowed. Is this coherent? According to Chilean doctrine, it could be coherent under the condition of accepting the distinction between killing and letting die and also the double effect doctrine. The problem is that there is abundant English literature in the realm of moral philosophy to disregard both conditions. Therefore, it is possible to claim that the Bill is not coherent and that the Chilean doctrine is based upon a distinction and a doctrine that are not acceptable.